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TAKING EVIDENCE AND BREAKING TREATIES:
AEROSPATIALE AND THE NEED
FOR COMMON SENSE
G. DWYER*
Lois A. Yurow• •

jAMES

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Evidence Convention or
Convention) 1 provides procedures by which litigants in United
States courts may obtain documents and other information
located in foreign states that are signatories to the Convention.
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1987 decision Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 2 held
that the Convention represents neither an exclusive nor a
mandatory means of obtaining evidence from abroad. The Convention, the Court ruled, imposes no restrictions on the powers
of a trial court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) to compel discovery from foreign litigants and to
impose sanctions for non-compliance. Rather, it simply provides
optional procedures which a U.S. trial court may elect to employ
after balancing the interests of the sovereign states and the litigants involved in a particular case.
This article challenges the rule of law which Aerospatiale established as violative of U.S. obligations under the Evidence Convention and likely to produce ill-reasoned trial court decisions
disfavoring use of Convention procedures. The authors advocate a rule requiring trial courts to honor requests by litigants
that the Convention procedures be followed, while preserving
the powers of the courts under the Federal Rules to award costs
• Associate, Coudert Brothers, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 1987, Yale University;
B.A., 1984, Boston College.
•• J.D. Candidate, 1989, The George Washington University National Law Center;
B.A., 1984, Brandeis t:niversity.
1. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 744 [hereinafter Evidence
Convention].
2. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale].
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and draw adverse inferences from insufficient compliance with
discovery orders. Such a rule would satisfy U.S. obligations
under the Convention, promote efficiency and fairness, and initiate a new era of rational and consistent decision-making in resolution of transnational disputes.
This article begins by identifying what the Evidence Convention added to the discovery process. For this purpose, it considers how discovery would proceed in international litigation in a
hypothetical no-Convention environment. The article then
examines specific provisions of the Evidence Convention and
reviews the divergent ways in which lower courts applied these
provisions prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Aerospatiale.
The authors propose a pragmatic contractual construction of
the Convention which focuses on its structure and the implicit
and explicit obligations it contains. This approach contrasts
sharply with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Aerospatiale. The
authors argue that the Supreme Court reached the wrong conclusion in Aerospatiale because it based its analysis on two faulty
premises: 1) that the silence of the Convention concerning its
effect on domestic law precludes the existence of a commitment
to use Convention procedures in the first instance, and 2) that to
require use of Convention procedures would create inequities
between U.S. and foreign litigants.
Finally, this article examines the lower court opinions that have
followed Aerospatiale and concludes that, by creating a presumption against use of the Convention and leaving lower courts
otherwise without guidance in exercising their discretion, the
Supreme Court has fostered decisions which inadequately analyze the interests at stake in individual cases and improperly
reject use of Convention procedures. The Aerospatiale opinion
does not appear to be susceptible of a narrowing interpretation,
insofar as it categorically rejects a presumption in favor of using
the treaty. The authors therefore conclude that if the original
objectives of the Convention are ever to be realized, it will be
necessary either to enact corrective domestic legislation or to
renegotiate the Convention so as to make its mandatory quality
more explicit.
II.

INTERNATIONAL D-IscovERY IN A No-CoNVENTION
ENVIRONMENT

To understand the effect which the Evidence Convention
should have on domestic U.S. law, it is helpful to consider how a
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U.S. court would supervise discovery in transnational litigation in
the absence of the Convention. In such a hypothetical regime, a
U.S. district court supervising discovery of documents or testamentary evidence located in a foreign state would be required to
operate within the bounds created by generally accepted principles of international law and by other law of the United States. 3
In defining these bounds, the court would begin with the principle of state territorial sovereignty, which is fundamental to customary ,intemationallaw.4 The Supreme Court enunciated this
principle in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power
which couid;mpose such restrictions.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of
a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. 5

The principle of territorial sovereignty both creates and limits
the lawful powers of a nation's government, including its judiciary. This principle forms the basis for the authority of a U.S.
court to fully ex~rcise its constitutional and statutory powers
within the United States, including its power to compel defendants over whom it has personal jurisdiction to comply with U.S.
statutory procedures for litigation. 6 At the same time, the principle of territorial sovereignty precludes a U.S. court from usurping the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign state over persons,

3. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary
international law is the law of the land of the United States).
4. See T. GnrrrARI, THE AMERICAN LAw OF SovEREIGN IMMUNITY 5 (1970).
5. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), ciud with approval in Verlinder B. V. v. Central Banke of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
6. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may compel the
production of documents, FED. R. Crv. P. 37, answers to interrogatories, id., admissions,
FED. R. Crv. P. 36, and the appearance for questioning of parties and persons under the
legal control of a party. FED. R. Crv. P. 37. The court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
conduct of litigation. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116.
Because the obligations rest in the United States, the parties are bound to comply fully
or suffer the consequences, even if compliance would necessitate violation of another
nation's law. See Societe Intemationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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property, or activities within that state's territory.' It bars any
assumption of jurisdiction to compel conduct in a foreign state
without that state's permission, particularly where the conduct in
question is prohibited by the law of the foreign state.s Thus, the
7. In practice, the exercise of jurisdiction by American couns affects foreign persons, propeny located abroad, and activities occurring abroad when a tangible link connects them to the U.S. forum. For example, U.S. couns may exercise jurisdiction over
persons who are citizens of foreign states when they have cenain "minimum contacts"
with the forum in which the coun resides. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, !J26
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This jurisdictional rule is justified because such persons have
purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within that forum.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The exercise of jurisdiction by a U.S.
court may also affect propeny located in a foreign state to the extent that a pany
chooses to satisfy a money judgment out of its assets located abroad. Finally, U.S. couns
have extended their jurisdiction to cover local effects of foreign conduct when U.S. law
prohibits those activities, so long as a foreign state has not compelled that conduct. See,
e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)
(holding defendants subject to liability under the Sherman Act, even though the prohibited conduct occurred in Canada, because the Canadian government did not compel that
conduct and it produced effects within the United States). The facts of the Aerospatiale
case were the mirror image of the facts in Continental On. The district coun issued an
order to compel conduct in the United States which required the defendant to engage in
an activity in France which that state prohibits. See Aerospatiall, 107 S. Ct. at 2544.
8. U.S. courts have issued injunctions to prohibit conduct abroad which has a
domestic effect, even though the conduct was consistent with the laws of the foreign
state where it took place. See Continental On, 370 U.S. 690. However, the principle of
territorial sovereignty suggests that the power of a U.S. coun over foreign conduct
should extend only as far as its authority to order payment of damages for the domestic
effects produced by the defendant's foreign conduct, and to enforce such an award by
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant's propeny located in the United States. See
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 543-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (permitting U.S. imponers to recover monies erroneously paid to exponers-who seized a
cigar business pursuant to a confiscatory decree by the Cuban government-by exercising set-off against future accounts, but not challenging the validity of the confiscation in
Cuba),I'TIIHlifod sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rn~'d sub
nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (agreeing
with the district court on this issue). U.S. couns have respected the sovereignty of foreign states to the extent of declining to order conduct which would be inconsistent with
the law or public policy of the state in which the conduct would occur. See United States
v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835,871-77 (D.NJ. 1953) (ordering the defendant
to cease anticompetitive activity affecting the United States, but declining to interfere
with the company's other activities and operations abroad).
U.S. couns have refrained from sitting in judgment of acts of foreign sovereigns
within their own territories. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). They have also refused to recognize any right of foreign states to act or compel
conduct within the United States that would be contrary to U.S. law or public policy. See
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), em. denied, 382 U.S.
1027 ( 1966) (refusing to enforce an Iraqi ordinance that would affect propeny of an
Iraqi citizen held by a U.S. bank). For U.S. courts to claim a right to act or compel
conduct contrary to the law of a foreign state would be inconsistent, and an unjustified
incursion into the foreign sovereign's jurisdiction. See A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONALjURISDICTION 94-98 (1988).
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authority of U.S. district courts extends to compelling or prohibiting behavior of litigants within the forum territory, but not to
compelling conduct which a litigant may need to carry out in a
foreign state prior to satisfying the court's order that certain
behavior - such as production ·of evidence - take place in the
forum territory. Correspondingly, the foreign state in which a
litigant must carry out acts preparatory to compliance with discovery in U.S. litigation may exercise complete dominion over
those acts, by controlling the manner of evidence-gathering
behavior, or even prohibiting such behavior altogether. The
effect of the two states exercising their bona fide authority may
be to create incompatible obligations for the requested litigant.
By applying tbese general principles to international litigation
occurring in a hypothetical no-Convention environment, we gain
insight into the practical and legal effect of the Evidence Convention. Assume Party A, a U.S. citizen, makes a discovery request
of Party B, a national of civil law Country X,9 and that the law of
Country X prohibits private parties from gathering evidence
within its borders for production in litigation abroad. 1o Party B
9. This is the most common scenario in transnational litigation before U.S. couru,
and the one which the Supreme Court considered in Aerospatiale. It is important to note,
however, that the Evidence Convention also applies to situations in which a litigant who
is a U.S. citizen must produce evidence located in a foreign state. Cf Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 15 (authorizing a diplomatic or consular officer to take evidence
from a fellow national within the officer's station country). This situation is not uncommon in light of the multinational character of many U.S. firms.
10. Common law nations, such as the United States, permit parties to a litigation to
conduct their own discovery - securing evidence and presenting a selected portion at
trial. Su FED. R. CIV. P. 26. In contrast, in civil law countries, such as France, the gathering of eYidence is a judicial function. The courts conduct discovery, requesting the
parties before them to produce evidence to the court during hearings. A party does not
request information directly from an opponent. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADJ·
TION 111-23 (1985); Brieffor the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 5-7, An-ospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695); REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCE (April, 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 785, 806 [hereinafter
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION).
Many civil law countries seek to preserve the official nature of evidence gathering by
prohibiting private parties from removing documents and information from the country
for production in foreign litigation. By enacting such "blocking laws," see infra note 87,
these countries may also be striving to protect their nationals from the burdens of discovery in a foreign court. Countries with blocking laws likely view them more as shields
than as affirmative restrictions, and permit their nationals to voluntarily comply with
foreign discovery requests. See Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, No.
80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (speculating on
the intent of France to enforce its blocking statute). Absent such flexible application of
their laws, these countries would be limiting the ability of their citizens to effectively
prosecute claims in foreign courts. /d. Countries are less likely to accede to requests by
their nationals for a waiver when the blocking law reflects a substantive and fundamental
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objects to the U.S. court that it is legally prevented from gathering the evidence and requests that the court use its discretionary
statutory power to execute a letter rogatory (or letter of
request) 11 seeking the assistance of Country X in gathering the
evidence. 12
In this hypothetical situation, the court would have two
options. The court may refuse to execute a letter rogatory and
simply issue an order for production.~!' If Party B fails to comply
with this order, the court may: 1) draw inferences adverse to
Party B with respect to any issue which the court cannot resolve
because of Party B's failure to produce evidence, 14 2) limit or
defer Party B's own discovery so as to put A and Bat an equal
disadvantage, 15 or 3) award to Party A the costs which Party A
public policy of the foreign state. Stt Societe lntemationale Pour Participations lndustrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (Swiss bank unable to get
pennission from the Swiss government to produce evidence needed to reclaim its property that the United States seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act).
In a properly operating legal regime, the threat of sanctions and costs for non-cooperation will render this "shield" ineffectual and actually hannful to the requested party in
U.S. litigation. The forum court will not waive a discovery order to accommodate a
blocking law, see id., so the litigant ultimately must choose either to comply with the
order or sustain the financial and procedural burdens that the forum court will impose.
Therefore, it is in the best interests of the producing party to seek a waiver of a foreign
blocking law or to comply fully with an initial discovery request when no blocking law
exists, and to request that the court issue a letter rogatory only when the foreign state's
law actually prevents it from gathering evidence. Thus, courts have no need to make a
factual detennination as to what the foreign law actually proscribes or as to the likelihood of its enforcement.
II. A letter rogatory (or letter of request) is a fonnal written communication sent
by a court where an action is pending to a court or judge in a foreign country. The letter
requests that the foreign court fonnally take the testimony of a witness who resides
within the jurisdiction of the foreign court, and transmit it to the requesting court for
use in the pending action. 8 C. WRIGHT Be A. Miu.ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE§ 2083 (1970). Letters rogatory are issued through diplomatic channels pursuant
to bilateral arrangements. Letters of request are issued pursuant to treaties. RESTATEMENT (fHIRD) oF FOREIGN RElATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES§ 473, reporter's note
I (1986).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 178l(a)(2), (b)(2) (1982) (providing that courts mJJY transmit letters rogatory either directly to foreign tribunals or with the assistance of the State
Department) (emphasis added); FED. R. C1v. P. 28(b) ("In a foreign country, depositions
mJJY be taken . . . pursuant to a letter rogatory.") (emphasis added).
13. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(a).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Cj Rogm, 357 U.S. at 207 (holding that federal
district courts may draw adverse inferences from a foreign plaintiff's non-compliance
with a production order, regardless of the party's good faith attempt to circumvent its
country's blocking statute).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) (the district court may allow either party a time longer
than the nonnal 30 days to respond to a discovery request); FED. R. CIV. P. 2.6(b), (c)
(the district court may limit the scope of either party's discovery).
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incurs in obtaining the evidence by other means. 16 The U.S.
court has no authority to order Party B to gather and remove
evidence from Country X. 17
Alternatively, the U.S. court may choose to honor Party B's
request by delivering a letter ·rogatory to judicial officers of
Country X. 18 If Cou_ntry X cooperates and the resulting evidence
is sufficient, the matter ends. If this avenue of discovery requires
more time or expense than the usual methods of gathering evidence located in the United States, the court may impose this
cost on the producing party. 19 Should the evidence which the
letter rogatory elicits prove insufficient because the laws of Country X regarding the methods or permissible scope of discovery
are more restrictive than those of the United States, 20 the U.S.
court would have the same sanctions available to it as in a case
where it does not employ a letter rogatory: The court may draw
inferences adverse to Party B with respect to the issues that the
unproduced evidence would have resolved, limit Party B's own
discovery, or order Party B to compensate Party A for costs Party·
A incurs in obtaining needed evidence by other means. 21
Either of these approaches would trigger adjustments in the
behavior of both individuals and governments. At the individual
level, Party B would exhaust every means available for compliance with a discovery request - including seeking a waiver of the
foreign state's blocking law22 - before it petitions the court to
employ letters rogatory, in order to avoid paying for that procedure or incurring sanctions for its failure to produce evidence. 2 s
16. Ft;n. R. CIV. P. 37(b}(2).
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781(a)(2), (b)(2) (1982). See Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 121
F. Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1954).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see Uebersee, 121 F. Supp. at 426 (requiring the foreign
party to post security for potential costs and expenses); infra note 128. The court may
also review the need for discovery requests to ensure that they are not designed only to
harass the requested party. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(l).
20. In the United States, under the Federal Rules, parties can obtain any information likely to lead to admissible evidence. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b). In contrast, courts in
civil law countries may restrict discovery to admissible evidence. See J. MERRYMAN, supra
note 10, at 115-19.
21. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
22. Supra note 10.
23. A party who is faced with choosing between inconsistent sovereign commands
cannot justify inadequate compliance or non-production of evidence by invoking the
defense of foreign sovereign compulsion; this doctrine protects only behavior occurring
within the state that compels it. See A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 94-98.
Thus, although the requested party may be prohibited from gathering evidence in
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Whatever the outcome, Party B - who willfully interjected itself
into U.S. territory - would rightfully shoulder the burdens
which U.S. law imposes by requiring compliance with discovery
requests, and which Country X imposes by its restrictions on evidence gathering. If foreign persons engaged in commerce with
U.S. entities regarded these burdens as too great, they would
restrict or cease their activities in the United States, or petition
the governments of the United States and other countries where
they operate to modify their laws and practices so as to remove
obstacles to international discovery. If foreign persons
threatened to restrict their activities to such a degree that U.S.
concerns would suffer from the loss of business, the latter might
offer more favorable contract terms, or join in petitioning the
governments concerned for more workable international discovery procedures. 24
At the government level, as a result of the petitioning of concerned private parties, either the United States or the foreign
state might unilaterally change its domestic discovery law to
require greater cooperation with the courts of other countries.
Sovereign states are generally unwilling to make such concessions to the preferred practices of other nations without receiving some concessions in return. Consequently, the governments
of the United States and of concerned foreign states would be
more likely to negotiate a treaty for the taking of evidence in
their countries by litigants before foreign courts. By creating
reciprocal commitments and concessions, such a treaty would
improve cooperation between countries in transnational litigation and create greater uniformity in the rules for international
discovery.
In the real world, prior to the 1970 Evidence Convention, U.S.
courts frequently refused to issue letters rogatory and simply
penalized parties for their failure to produce evidence when a

another country, he is not excused from producing the evidence in the U.S. court. If
litigants know that U.S. courts will exercise their full authority to order production and
impose sanctions such that a letter rogatory and assertion of blocking statutes will not
protect them from the requirement of full compliance, they will be discouraged from
making unnecessary requests.
24. The authors presume to attribute to actors in the international arena a greater
degree of sophistication than one might attribute to persons acting only locally. We
therefore place greater faith in the ability of the market to adjust to changes in the international legal climate than we might in a domestic context. See infra note 81.
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foreign state's laws prevented them from complying with a discovery request. 25 The result was to leave unreconciled conflicting demands on producing parties and to frustrate the needs of
requesting parties when evidence located abroad was not forthcoming. Some courts expressed concern for the interests of the
foreign state involved and crafted discovery orders to minimize
the burden on the producing party and the affront to the foreign
sovereign. 26 Those courts that did employ letters rogatory recognized that, although use of the letters was optional, it was the
only means by which the producing litigant could legally obtain
the requested evidence from the foreign state involved. 27 On the
whole, the practice of U.S. courts was sufficiently unsatisfactory
that pressure mounted for negotiation of a treaty to govern the
taking of evidence located outside a forum state, as predicted in
the hypothetical situation above.
Ill.

THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

The 1968 Hague Conference on Private International Law
launched the discussion that culminated in the Evidence Convention. 28 The United States was a key proponent of the treaty,
because American litigants involved in actions requiring the discovery of evidence located abroad had long been frustrated by
25. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. ~. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
26. Set In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 , 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (requiring a
bank to produce documents held by its Panamanian office only if the United States government could obtain a waiver of Panamanian secrecy laws on the bank's behalf).
27. E.g., Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that witnesses would prevail in their motion to quash if, in response to letters rogatory, Canadian courts found that the production of the requested documents would violate
Canadian law); United States v. Paraffin Wax, 2255 Bags, 23 F.R.D. 289, 290 (E.D.N.Y.
1959); Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 19 F.R.D. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
("Letters rogatory constitute the only procedure available to obtain plaintiff's testimony
[in Poland)."); Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 121 F. Supp. 420, 425-26
(D.D.C. 1954) (granting, over the defendant's objections regarding expense and delay,
the intervening plaintiff's motion to issue letters rogatory for depositions in Switzerland); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court for the County of Sacremento, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 507-08, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221-22 (1973).
28. See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, supra note 10, at 785. Twenty
nations have since signed the Evidence Convention. The signatories are Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 8 MARTINDALEHUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15 (1988).
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the differences in attitudes and procedures between U.S. and for·
eign courts, especially courts of civil law countries. 29 The pri·
mary purposes identified for the Convention were to "bridge the
gap, between different discovery procedures in civil and com·
mon law states, and to facilitate discovery in a manner " 'tolera·
ble' to the authorities of the State where it is taken and . . .
'utilizable' in the forum where the action will be tried. " 5 o
The Convention provides essentially two procedures for
obtaining evidence from a signatory state. The first is the use of
"letters of request,, a traditional method by which the court
hearing a case transmits to a court of the foreign state where evidence is located a request for assistance in gathering that evidence. 51 All signatories must comply with letters of request that
relate to "commenced or contemplated" civil or commercial proceedings,52 and that are specific as to the parties, the nature and
source of evidence requested, and any preferred procedure for
the taking of that evidence. 55 Execution of the request must be
expeditious and in the manner requested, unless that method is
incompatible with the internal law of the requested state54 or is
impossible to perform. 55 This commitment represents a major
concession on the part of civil law countries, whose procedures
for taking evidence in litigation are more restrictive than those of
common law countries. 56
The Convention provides that a state receiving a letter of
request may refuse full compliance if execution of that request is
not within the competence of the judiciary of the receiving state
or if execution would threaten the sovereignty or security of that

29. REPORT or THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, supra note 10, at 804-06.
30. /d. at 806.
31. Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, T.I.A.S. No. 744.
32. /d.
33. /d. an. 3, 23 U.S.T. at 2558, T.I.A.S. No. 744. A United States court can, for
example, request a verbatim transcript of a deposition, even though the usual practice in
the executing state may call for only a judicially prepared summary ofthe evidence. Sn,
e.g., Brieffor the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 20, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987) (No. 85-1695) (discussing modifications to French law to accommodate U.S.-style
discovery).
34. Incompatibility requires a direct conflict with the constitution or legislation of
the state. States may not claim incompatibility merely because a requested method is
different from the usual internal procedure of the state. REPORT or THE UNITED STATES
DELEGATION, supra note )0, at 810.
.
35. Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, T.I.A.S. No. 744.
36. See supra note 10.
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state.s7 In addition, the drafters of the Convention provided that
states may condition ratification of, or accession to, the treaty on
a rule that they will not execute letters of request for "pre-trial"
discovery of documents. 88 The record of Convention negotiations indicates that this option was to be simply a safeguard
against American-style "fishing expeditions," and not a means
for civil law countries to avoid their commitments under the
treaty. 89
The Convention also introduced a second method for
37. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, an. 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63, T.I.A.S. No.
744.
38. ld an. 23, 2~ U.S.T. at 2568, T.I.A.S. No. 744. "A Contracting State may at the
time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute a Letter of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known
in Common Law Countries." Jd
39. Use of the term "pre-trial" in article 2S generated confusion due to the absence
of a shared understanding of the tenn. Many delegates to the Special Commission on
the Operation of the Evidence Convention "were of the view that 'pre-trial discovery'
meant some son of a proceeding pennitted under American law prior to the institution·
of a lawsuit ... 'to detennine whether there might be some evidence somewhere which
would support a lawsuit.' " REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING
OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR CoMMERCIAL MATTERS, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1417,
1421 (1978) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION). Delegates funher
pointed out that the breadth of American discovery requests (e.g., "aU notes related
to ... ") seemed abusive. ld at 1422-23.
To date, sixteen of the twenty Convention signatories have made reservations under
Article 23. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 13-26 (1988). However, many states have qualified these reservations so that requests for specific documents will be honored. ld Nine reservations are now expressed in a variation of the
following:
[The Contracting State] understand[s] 'Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents' ... as including any Letter
of Request which requires a person:
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter
of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody or power; or
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in
the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the requested court to
be, or be likely to be, in his possession, custody or powers.
ld at 21 (reservation of the United Kingdom). This language permits the requested
court to decide whether particular documents are relevant. Some states require only
that the requesting court certify that the documents are in the "possession, custody or
power" of the requested party. Set id. at 19 (reservation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands).
This qualification obviates the concerns expressed in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552,
that civil law countries would uniformly and arbitrarily refuse to execute American discovery requests. If letters rogatory enumerate the desired material with reasonable
specificity and explain t.he relevance of the requested evidence, other nations are bound
to assist. See Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Aemspatialt, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (stating that in the period from 1980-85,
the FRG executed 154 of the 181 letters of request it received; the balance were rejected
as too general or premature); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 24-
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obtaining evidence located in foreign states. Diplomatic or consular officers of the state hearing the case may take depositions or
receive documents in the foreign state in which they are stationed. 40 The treaty permits diplomatic or consular officers to
take evidence from nationals of their own state,41 or from nationals of the state they serve, with permission from the government
of that state.42 A related option allows the court hearing a case to
appoint a commissioner to travel abroad and take evidence from
parties or witnesses.48 The drafters of the Convention made
these provisions entirely optional on the part of signatory states44
in deference to the policy of civil law countries that evidence
gathering is an exclusively judicial function. 45
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE CoNVENTION IN

UNITED STATES COURTS

For seventeen years following ratification of the Evidence Convention by the United States, U.S. courts were unable to agree on
whether, and under which circumstances, they were required to
use Convention procedures for obtaining evidence located in the
territory of another signatory state. Some courts viewed the
Convention as the preferred means for securing evidence when
the law of the foreign state prohibited the party producing evidence from gathering and removing documents or information
from its territory. These courts required that discovery requests
issue pursuant to the Convention before they would execute a
Rule 37 order compelling production.4 &
25,Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (discussing the lenient procedures
for obtaining discovery in France).
40. Evidence Convention, supra note l. arts. 15-16, 18-21, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-67,
T.I.A.S. No. 744.
41. !d. art. 15, 23 U.S.T. at 2564, T.I.A.S. No. 744. A signatory state may neverthe·
less require such officers to obtain permission from a designated official of that state
before taking evidence from their fellow nationals. !d.; see REPORT OF mE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION, supra note 10, at 816.
42. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, T.I.A.S. No.
744.
43. !d. arts. 17-21, 23 U.S.T. at 2565-67, T.I.A.S. No. 744.
44. !d. art. 33, 23 U.S.T. at 2571, T.I.A.S. No. 744. Only two states, Argentina and
Singapore, have completely prohibited depositions by diplomatic and consular officers.
See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL I...Aw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15- 16, 20 (1988). Several other
states have agreed to limited use of this method; they require reciprocity and refuse to
assist with government compulsion or to allow depositions of locals. See id. at 13-26.
45. Set supra note 10.
46. E.g.• Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
211, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("The Hague Convention, signed by West Germany. provides
an obvious and preferable means of obtaining evidence within that country."); Pierburg
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.Courts deciding in favor of Convention procedures generally
focused less on the ultimate responsibility of the litigants to produce evidence in the United States than on the interests of the
state in which the evidence was located:" This approach suggests that the interests of the foreign state limit the constitutional
authority and obligation48 of U.S. courts to prosecute the cases
before them. However, no court offered constitutional or statutory support for such a proposition.
Although these courts reached a result which accords with the
spirit and intent of the Convention, their rationale for its application was flawed. By signing the Convention, the United States
made a commitment to other signatories to adhere to its terms.
As with all nations, the sovereignty of the United States is compromised only to the extent of its willful agreement. 49 By predicating their analyses upon unnecessary consideration of foreign
state interests and the amorphous concept of "comity,"50 rather
than focusing on these U.S. commitments, the courts obfuscated
the issue most pertinent to a determination of when the Convention applies - interpretation of U.S. contractual obligations
under the Convention.
GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878
( 1982) ("California courts must compel the litigants to first attempt . . . discovery in
conformity with th[e] Convention.").
4 7. Two arguments are common in opinions of courts that, prior to Atrospatiak,
mandated use of the Convention or other procedures known to be acceptable to the
requested state. The first focuses on judicial sovereignty- the notion in civil1aw countries that the gathering of evidence is solely a judicial function. Set General Electric v.
North Star Int'l Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citations
omitted) ("The whole point of requiring (as opposed to permitting) a litigant to seek
discovery through the procedures established by the Hague Convention is to avoid
infringing the judicial sovereignty of the foreign nation involved; that is the primary
purpose of the treaty."); Pierburg, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 244-45, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 881
("The foundation of the Convention is to avoid international friction where a domestic
state court orders civil discovery to be conducted within the territory of a civil law nation
that views such unilateral conduct as an intrusion upon its judicial sovereignty."); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, Alameda County, 123 Cal. App. 3d
840, 852-55, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 881-83 (1981).
The second argument rests on comity - "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation .. .. "
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Courts advocating a comity analysis contend that "courts of one sovereign state should not . . . require acts or forebearances
within the territory, and inconsistent with the internal law, of another sovereign state
unless a careful weighing of competing interests and alternative means makes clear that
the order is justified." Volkswagenwerk Aktimgesellsclw.ft, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 176 Cal.
Rptr. at 884.
48. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
49. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) .
50. See supra note 47.
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While some courts reached the right result for the wrong reason, other courts did not require that Convention procedures be
used at all. These courts concluded that adherence to the treaty
would displace the Federal Rules 51 and would engender greater
delay and expense in litigation.52 These opinions reveal a basic
misunderstanding of the impact of the Convention on the discovery process in U.S. courts.
The proposition that use of Convention procedures would displace the Federal Rules eiToneously assumes that construing the
Convention to require a U.S. court to comply with a litigant's
request for assistance in obtaining evidence from a foreign signatory state would preclude the court from exercising ultimate control over the discovery process. Specifically, it assumes that after
the court employs Convention procedures, it could not issue a
Rule 37 order for production or impose sanctions for incomplete
discovery, as it would do in a no-Convention environment. However, neither the structure of the treaty nor its history compels
the conclusion that Convention procedures would abrogate or
suspend any of the Federal Rules.ss
Some courts, concerned about the displacement of the Federal
51. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court,
788 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) ("The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, not the Hague Convention, normally govern discovery ... [in] United States
couns even when the documents are located abroad."), vacated, 823 F.2d 382 (9th Cir.
1987); In re Anschuetz &: Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. vacated, 107
S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (for reconsideration in light of Aerospatiale); Lasky v. Continental
Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
52. See In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 612 ("Requiring that ... discovery be processed
through foreign authorities would work a drastic and very costly change in the handling
of this type oflitigation."); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503,523-24 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (equating international judicial cooperation and the use of Convention procedures with pre-litigation of discovery disputes in two different judicial systems).
The irony of the objection as to time and expense is the implication that use of Convention procedures actually contravenes the treaty's underlying goal. In Societe Nationale,
the court noted that the purpose of the Convention is to facilitate discovery and make
needed information more accessible to litigants, but implied that because the Federal
Rules permit access to more information more expeditiously than the Convention, they
provide the preferable procedures. 788 F.2d at 1411. Su also In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at
606 ("We believe that requiring domestic litigants to resort to the Hague Convention to
compel discovery ... encourages the concealment of information . .. a result directly
antithetical to the express goals of the Federal Rules and the Hague Convention.").
53. The Convention procedures in no way conflict with the Federal Rules. After
unsuccessfully assisting a party to obtain evidence from one foreign source which that
party has identified, a court need not refrain from ordering the party to produce the
evidence by any other means possible, and from using sanctions to enforce that order.
See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 211.
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Rules, pointed out correctly that they have no duty to modify
their procedures for litigants who must produce evidence in the
United States and who encounter difficulty in gathering that evidence.54 However, many of these courts wrongly concluded
from that fact that the Convention has no application to the production of evidence by a party subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court. 55 In fact, several advanced the theory that
the Convention governs only the taking of evidence from foreign
non-party witnesses who are beyond the jurisdiction of the forum
court and who are willing to be deposed only at home, or are not
willing to be deposed at all. 56 However, the fact that a state has
212-14 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that discovery should proceed pursuant to the Convention, but that the court would use available sanctions if compliance with discovery orders
was incomplete); infra note 81 and accompanying text.
Several courts that declined to utilize Convention procedures argued that to do so and
to then order production, pursuant to Rule 37, of any remaining evidence would constitute a great insult to the receiving state. E.g., Graco, I 0 I F.R.D. at 525. As Justice Stevens rightly pointed out in his Aerospatiale opinion, there is no reason to think that the_
other signatories believed the United States was relinquishing its ultimate control over
litigation in its courts. See 107 S. Ct. at 2555-55.
54. See, e.g., Societe Nationale, 188 F.2d at 1411; In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611;
Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, No. 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May SO,
1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). These courts reason that since "preparatory
acts" such as selecting deponents and documents do not require the participation (in the
form of oath-taking or compulsion) of a foreign judicial entity, or the presence of an
adverse party on foreign soil, they do not intrude on judicial sovereignty or custom.
However, this argument refutes a non-issue. Regardless of whether preparatory acts in
another country intrude on that nation's judicial sovereignty, U.S. courts have no juris·
diction to compel such acts. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, it is true that United States' courts need not alter their discovery orders
to accommodate foreign laws. Fairness and expedience dictate that courts place on the
requested litigant the burden of exhausting all possible sources and means of collecting
the requested evidence, rather than having courts entertain proofs that one foreign
state's blocking laws foreclose all possibilities for the litigant to comply with discovery
orders.
55. In rt Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 615 ("The Hague Convention has no application at
all to the production of evidence in this country by a party subject to the jurisdiction of a
district court .... "); Lasky, 569 F. Supp. at 1228. See also Rich v. KIS California, Inc.,
121 F.R.D. 254, 258-60 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that the Federal Rules and not the
Evidence Convention are appropriately used for discovery to determine whether the
foreign party is subject to the court's jurisdiction).
56. Seeln reAnschuetz., 754 F.2d at 615; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 520. The Eighth Circuit
in Aerospatillle agreed with this analysis, In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale,
782 F.2d 120, 125 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), but the Supreme
Court expressly rejected it, holding that "the Convention draws no distinction between
evidence obtained from third parties and that obtained from the litigants themselves
.... " 107 S. Ct. at 2554. The United States government rejects this interpretation as
well. See Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 ( 1987) (No. 85-1695) ("Neither the
United States nor foreign signatories to the Convention have ever subscribed to the
interpretation adopted by the court below.").
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absolute authority over matters within its territory does not preclude the possibility that the United States chose to bind itself by
international agreement to act in a way that it would not otherwise be required to, in order to make it easier for both foreign
and U.S. nationals to comply with its sovereign commands. 57
While U.S. courts had no constitutional or statutory obligation
prior to 1970 to employ letters of request at the behest of parties
before them,58 the Hague Evidence Convention did create such
an obligation.s9
The objection of some courts that Convention procedures
would add time and expense to litigation ignores a court's
authority, undiminished by the Convention, to allocate costs in
an equitable fashion. 60 The objection presumes that when foreign state law actually prevents a party from gathering and
removing evidence from that state, there are other means by
which the requesting party can obtain such evidence. However,
even in a no-Convention environment, courts would find it necessary to use letters rogatory to enable litigants to lawfully comply with requests for evidence located in such countries. 61 In
such a case, the only alternative to letters rogatory and the additional methods provided by the Convention is non-production
and the imposition of sanctions against the producing party,
including the drawing of adverse inferences from the lack of evidence.62 While a requesting party may prefer to win by default
57. The drafting history of the Convention indicates that the contracting states
clearly intended to address discovery from parties and non-parties alike. SN Brief for
the Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association as Amicus Curiae at 14, AerospatilJie, 107
S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (citations omitted) (noting that the drafters of the
Convention considered specifying the treaty's applicability to "witnesses, parties or
experts" and deemed the language superfluous); Brief for Petitioners at 18-19, Aerospatiak, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (citations omitted) (noting that if the parties
intended for jurisdiction to control the scope of the Convention, that would have been
mentioned in the document or its negotiation history, and the civil law countries would
not have amended their civil codes to facilitate compliance); Brief for the Republic of
France as Amicus Curiae at 18, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (noting
that the drafters of the Convention would not fail to address one of the principal sources
of conRict in transnational litigation - that of discovery from the parties).
58. SN supra note 12 and accompanying text.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 63-82.
60. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(f). As discussed above, persons operating in international
commerce can account for the potential costs of litigation when ordering their private
affairs. They can refrain from dealings with U.S. citizens, petition their own and the U.S.
government for changes in the rules under which they must operate, or continue to
trade with the United States, knowing the risks involved, and bargain for contracts which
protect their interests. Supra note I 0; notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
61. SN supra notes 3-27 and accompanying text; infra note 98.
62. Stt supra notes 3-27 and accompanying text.
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rather than to litigate the case, this outcome conflicts with values
of due process and accurate decision-making, as well as the
United States' contractual obligations under the Convention, all
of which far outweigh such a preference.

v.

A

COMMON SENSE INTERPRETATION OF
THE EVIDENCE CONVENTION65

The Evidence Convention does not by its terms express what
effect it is to have on the domestic laws of the signatory states.
This is appropriate in light of the variety of domestic rules that
exist among the signatory nations. The record of the Convention
negotiations is .also silent on this issue.64 Nevertheless, the Convention contains reciprocal commitments which by their nature
indicate what relationship the treaty bears to the domestic law of
each state. As discussed below, a contractual interpretation of
these tenns65 reveals that the United States made commitments
concerning its role as a state issuing letters of request. In the
United States, these treaty commitments are the law of the
land. 66
When nations receive requests to assist in the taking of evidence for litigation in another country, the Convention commitments are clear: all signatory nations must comply with properly
6!J. "[T]he construction of a contract as to its operation and effect will, after all,
depend less on artificial rules than on the application of good sense and sound equity to
the object and spirit of the contract in the given case." 17 AM. juR. 2o Contracts § 243
(1964).
· 64. Several courts have pointed to language in the reports of the U.S. delegation to
the drafting conference to the effect that the Convention requires no change in U.S. law
or practice. In re Anschuetz 8c Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 610 n.l9 (5th Cir. 1985);
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). However, this language appears in the context of discussions about the obligations of receiving states, not sending states, and refers to the already generous provisions
in U.S. law for cooperation with requests from foreign courts for assistance with discovery in cases before them. One of the United States delegates to the conference stated:
the very liberal and open practice in the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
[Assistance for foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such
tribunals], under § !J.02 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act [Assistance to Tribunals and Litigants Outside the State], and under the
practice of most of the fifty States, means that the convention requires minimal
internal changes in United States practice, while at the same time it will greatly
enlarge the assistance given to United States courts and litigants in many other
states.
Amram, RqxJrt on the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International lAw, 63
AM. j. INT'L l. 521, 526 (1969).
65. "A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations." Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243. 253 (1984).
66. U.S. CoNST. art. VI.
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executed letters of request except under very limited circumstances.67 This commitment did not constitute consideration in
the contractual sense on the part of the United States. Since
1964, U.S. law has permitted private parties in foreign litigation
to gather evidence independently in the United States or to
solicit personally the assistance of a U.S. court when compulsion
of persons in the United States is necessary. 68 Accordingly, foreign courts rarely have reason to transmit letters of request to
U.S. courts. Rather, these provisions constitute the consideration given by those signatories whose laws prohibit litigants
before foreign courts from culling evidence within their territory,
who were previously unwilling to comply with discovery requests
from foreign courts, or who characteristically objected to the
type of discovery that the Convention permits.69
To identify the commitments and consideration that the
United States tendered in this arrangement, it is therefore necessary to determine what the Convention might add to litigation in
the United States, when the United States is the state issuing,
rather than receiving a letter of request. The focus should be on
the beneficiaries of the treaty and the manner in which each
nation's concessions serve their particular needs.
The only actor in the litigation who benefits directly from the
Convention is the party asked to produce evidence that lies in a
67. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). In addition, there is no evidence in the Convention
history that any signatory nation had difficulty in securing the cooperation of U.S. courts
with letters of request when help was needed. U.S. courts may not deny a request for
assistance from a foreign tribunal or litigant because of a lack of reciprocity on the pan
of the foreign state. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
One could argue that the United States' consideration was a promise not to modify its
generous law and practice. In a contract between private parties, one party's agreement
not to amend its practices in the futur~ might serve as consideration for another's promise. Set 17 AM. juR. 2D Contracts § 124 (1964). This is not possible in a treaty context:
Absent a constitutional amendment, the President and Senate may not bind the United
States to refrain from passing legislation that is inconsistent with a treaty. In any case,
there is no evidence that any signatory to the Convention was concerned that the United
States might reverse its practice.
69. These countries have, since ratifying the Convention, modified their internal
laws to effectuate their obligations under it. For example, France amended its code of
civil procedure to add provisions that "radically depart from traditional French rules by
opening the Republic of Frances's borders to United States-style discovery." Brief for
the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at 19, Atrospatiak, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No.
85-1695). These provisions permit, inltr alia, a full transcript of depositions rather than
the standard civil law summary. and direct and cross examination by the parties' attorneys rather than a judge. /d. at 18-27; stt supra note I 0.
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foreign country which has an effective blocking statute. 70 As discussed earlier, the failure of a party to comply with discovery in
no way infringes on the sovereign authority of the U.S. court
itself; it has the power simply to sanction the party for its noncompliance.71 The Convention, therefore, does not protect any
sovereign interest of the United States. Nor does the Convention
protect or assist a party making discovery demands of its adversary in a U.S. court, as the court has ample authority to do that
without Convention procedures. 72 Finally, the Convention provides no direct benefit to a foreign state in whose territory
requested evidence lies; fundamental principles of international
law7s already protect the territorial sovereignty of that state and
U.S. courts have never had authority to threaten it. 74
How, specifically, does the requested party benefit from the
70. The state of which this party is a national does benefit indirectly from its citizen's greater success in U.S. litigation, and the state which is the situs of the evidence
benefits from not having to prosecute the producing party for violation of its blocking
law. In addition, all affected states benefit indirectly by the removal of obstacles to trade
and by the ability of U.S. courts to make more accurate and equitable judgments in
transnational litigation. But the immediate beneficiary of the Convention is clearly the
producing party, for whom the Convention mitigates the hardship of satisfying the
incompatible demands of two sovereign nations.
71. See supra text accompanying note 53.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 62. The. one area in which the Convention might directly assist a requesting party is in the taking of testimony from a witness
who is neither a party nor under the legal control of a party, and who prefers to be
deposed in his or her own country or refuses to testify at all. Such persons are not
subject to compulsion by the district court, and thus can only be reached by the Convention if they will not voluntarily enter the forum. Some courts, before the Aerospatiale
decision, concluded that the Convention only applies to the taking of evidence from
such recalcitrant third party witnesses. See supra note 56. This interpretation would
render the Convention completely one-sided, incorporating commitments only by the
civil law signatories, since procedures were already in place in the United States to assist
parties before foreign courts in the taking of such depositions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782
(1982). The language of the Convention and its history make clear that the Convention
applies to the taking of all types of evidence in a foreign state. See Evidence Convention,
rupra note I, art. 3(0, (g) (providing for examination of persons and inspection of documents and real and personal property); supra note 56.
73. E.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812).
74. To understand this point, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction
between gathering and producing evidence. The sovereignty of a foreign state does not
~xtend to control of litigation in the United States - the production of evidence--just
is the sovereignty of the United States does not extend to activities abroad which are
incident to that litigation - the gathering of evidence. See id. While the gathering of
~vidence abroad may offend the sovereignty of a foreign state, it is not the U.S. court
:hat causes that offense, but the producing party who must take action abroad to comply
Nith a production order.
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Convention? U.S. law already made use ofletters of request permissive by U.S. courts. 75 The requested party benefits by the
commitment of the receiving state to comply with letters of
request but, as stated above,7 6 this commitment was the consideration given by countries other than the United States - the civil
law countries in particular. These countries could have obligated
themselves unilaterally to assist U.S. courts,7 7 or signed a treaty
only among themselves, if the United States had offered nothing
in return for this commitment. Similarly, the provision allowing
diplomatic officials or court-appointed commissioners to take evidence in their territory was a unilateral concession on the part of
signatory nations other than the United States; U.S. law already
pennitted such-evidence-gathering procedures. 78
Therefore, the only possible commitment which the United
States brought to the Convention, and the one that courts must
ascribe to it,79 was to require its courts to honor the requests of
parties before them to employ the Convention procedures to
assist the parties in complying with discovery requests.80 A con-·
elusion that the United States made a greater commitment to
75. 28 u.s.c. § 1781 (1982).
76. Supra text accompanying note 69.
77. The United States in 1964 made such a unilateral offer of broad judicial assist·
ance in the taking of evidence in the United States for foreign judicial proceedings. 5«
Act of Oct.!, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 8(a), 78 Stat. 996 (1964} (codified at28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1982)).
78. 5« 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982) (district courts may order persons within their
jurisdiction to provide testimonial or documentary evidence requested for use in a foreign proceeding).
79. Where ... a contract ... is susceptible of two constructions, one of which
makes. it fair. customary, and such as prudent men would naturally execute,
while the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men would
not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which makes a fair, rational, and
probable contract must be preferred.
17 AM. juR. 2o Contracts § 252 (1964) (footnote omitted). "It is necessary to consider
the situation of the panies at that time, the necessities for which they naturally provided,
the advantages each probably sought to secure." Pritchard v. Wick, 178 A.2d 725, 727
(Pa. 1962).
80. [l)f the convention does not restrict unilateral extraterritorial discovery
methods, then the civil law countries received no meaningful quid pro quo for
their concessions to the United States . . . . While there is no requirement of
"consideration" in international treaty law, unilateral concession is not the
most pr~bable explanation for the behavior of governments in international
negouauons.
Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidmct Abroad: The
Impact oftk Hogue Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 760-61 (1983). Su Brief
for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae at ll-l2,Aerospahah, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987)
(No. 85-1695).
Naturally, this obligation does not arise until the producing party demonstrates that
the requested evidence is, in fact, located in a foreign state. U.S. courts might also
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prohibit its courts from issuing orders and imposing sanctions
under the Federal Rules after exhausting Convention procedures
- i.e., to make the Convention exclusive - would be nonsensical. Trial court judges are neither required nor able to determine conclusively all potential sources of evidence. Therefore,
even after tapping one source identified by the producing party
by directing a request under the Convention to a foreign state,
the court must continue to place the burden on the producing
party to locate and produce requested evidence by whatever
means possible. The court must also retain the authority to sanction a party who does not satisfy this obligation.81
Thus, a common sense look at the language and history of the
Convention- what it adds to a no-Convention regime, and what
commitments it embodies in the context of an international contractual arrangement - compels the conclusion that U.S. law
requires U.S. courts to employ Convention procedures to assist a
party who requests use of those procedures to comply with a discovery request. Invocation of the Convention procedures does
not detract from the requested party's ultimate obligation to produce all properly requested evidence; nor does it affect the
court's authority under the Federal Rules to order full compliance with the initial discovery request and to draw adverse inferences from, and assess costs occasioned by, any whole or pa~tial
noncompliance with this order.s2
require, consistent with the purposes of the Convention, that the producing party
demonstrate that the law of the foreign state, at least on its face, prohibits it from gathering the requested evidence on its own as it would in the United States. Imposing the
costs of the Convention procedures on the requested party and holding that party ultimately responsible for full production of requested evidence will be sufficient disincentive to invocation of the Convention when it is not necessary.
8I. For this same reason, the courts are not obligated to initiate Convention procedures absent a request from the producing party. Further, and consistent with the
notion of holding a party ultimately responsible for the production of evidence which it
controls and of which it has the best knowledge, courts should impose sanctions on a
producing party who does not satisfactorily comply with a discovery order regardless of
that party's good faith or bad faith in attempting to comply. See Societe Intemationale
Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. I97, 213
(1958) (district court is justified in drawing adverse inferences from gaps in plaintiff's
evidence even though the plaintiff made a good faith attempt to produce all requested
documents). The courts may justifiably attribute to actors in the international arena a
level of sophistication sufficiently high that they may be said to have knowingly assumed
the risk of litigation and the costs such litigation would entail. Again, a uniform rule will
permit these actors to adjust their behavior in the direction of greater efficiency and
rationality.
82. The Convention limits the scope of discovery to evidence "intended for use in
judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated." Evidence Convention, supra note
I, art. I. Many of the signatory nations have registered reservations under Article 23
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THE AEROSPATIALE DECISION

In 1986,88 the Supreme Court accepted the task of defining
conclusively the circumstances in which U.S. courts must adhere
to the Evidence Convention in domestic litigation. The Court's
putative goal was to introduce uniformity and predictability into
decisions regarding the taking of evidence abroad. However, the
Court failed in this task, and instead established a rule oflaw that
conflicts with U.S. obligations under the Convention. The decision requires U.S. trial courts to reassess in each case the very
state interests which the Hague Conference negotiators fully considered and carefully balanced in drafting the Evidence
Convention.
The Aerospatiale case involved a personal injury claim by three
American citizens ag(linst Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (Aerospatiale) and another French corporation in a U.S. district court in Iowa.84 The plaintiffs sought damages for injuries
arising out of the crash in Iowa of an airplane that the French·
companies had designed, manufactured, and sold. The American plaintiffs pursued discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Aerospatiale, an enterprise owned by the French
government, requested an order that would limit the plaintiffs to
use of Convention discovery · procedures to collect evidence
located in France.85 The French defendants argued that the Convention provided the exclusive means for obtaining evidence
abroad86 because a French criminal law, a so-called "blocking
regarding requests for pre-trial discovery. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
Therefore, the evidence produced by Convention procedures may sometimes be less
than that·requested by U.S. litigants, as U.S. law permits panies to request any evidence,
whether it will prove admissible or not, which "appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l). A judge may have difficulty determining the incremental damage done by a failure to produce evidence which
would not be used in the proceeding but which might have led to the discovery of admissible evidence. However, this problem is not created by the Evidence Convention, but
rather, would exist even in a no-Convention environment. See supra note 20 (comparing
the scope of discovery that civil and common law states permit). The Convention may
even expand the scope of discovery which receiving states are willing to allow. Cf. Brief
for the Republic ofFrance as Amicus Curiae at 18-22,AtrOSpaliale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987)
(No. 85-1695) (noting the liberalizing changes that the French government made in discovery procedures after ratification of the Convention).
83. Inn Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
84. Jones v. Societe Nationale lndustrielle Aerospatiale, Civ. No. 82-453-C (S.D.
Iowajuly 31, 1985).
85. Aeropatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
86. /d.
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statute," precluded them from complying with any discovery
request not made in accordance with the treaty.s 7 The magistrate
denied the order.88 Aerospatiale appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 89 and then sought relief
from the Supreme Court.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court ruling. 90 The Court held that the Convention is a
"permissive supplement," rather than a "pre-emptive replacement," for other means of obtaining evidence located abroad. 91
The Court directed district courts to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether Convention procedures are appropriate, just as
they would decide any other discovery issue. 92 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens admonished trial courts, in the interest
of comity, to "exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from ... unnecessary ... or unduly burdensome discovery•• and to "demonstrate due respect, for the problems of
foreign litigants and the concerns of their countries.95 District
courts should decide whether to use the Convention procedures
by conducting a "particularized analysis of the respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation, and should
87. C. PEN. 80-538, art. 1A., reprinted in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546 n .6. This
section of the French Penal Code provides:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing, orally
or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence with a view to
foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection therewith.
France is not alone in promulgating a "blocking statute" that prohibits the gathering
of evidence for use in foreign judicial proceedings. States having such laws intend them
to advance one or more of the following purposes: 1) to protect the state's legitimate
interests in non-disclosure, 2) to attract questionable but lucrative business enterprises
in need of secrecy, and 3) to limit the reach of American investigations into foreign
economic activity. Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and United States Discovery: A Conflict of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1061, 1063-65 (1983). France
promulgated its blocking statute primarily for the third purpose. Toms, The Frmch
Response to Extraterritorilll Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAw. 585, 586
(1981).
88. See 107 S. Ct. at 2544.
89. In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). The court of appeals held that the Convention applies
only to the taking of depositions from non-parties in a foreign state, and not to the
production of evidence by persons over whom the district court has jurisdiction. /d. at
125. The Supreme Court, while affirming the Eighth Circuit's ruling, summarily
rejected this finding. 107 S. Ct. at 2554.
90. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
91. /d. at 2551.
92. See id. at 2557.
93. Id.

462

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

[Vol. 21

assess the "likelihood that resort to [the] procedures will prove
effective. " 94 Justice Stevens cited the existence of a blocking law
as one factor to consider in this analysis, because a blocking statute is indicative of the sovereign interests of the foreign state. 95
Nevertheless, the opinion made clear that courts should not
accord dispositive weight to these statutes.96 The majority provided no further guidance with respect to the method district
courts should use to perform this comity analysis.
An examination of Justice Stevens• majority opinion from the
perspective of our common sense understanding of the Convention•s place in domestic law reveals that the opinion is both analytically and practically unsound. Justice Blackmun, in his
94. /d. at 2555~56. The Couit noted that the drafters of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States approved this type of analysis. /d. at 2556. That
body recommends that an American court consider five factors when issuing an order
for discovery from abroad:
[ 1) the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested; [2] the degree of specificity of the request; [!]
whether the information originated in the United States; [4) the availability of
alternative means of securing the information; and [5] the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the
United States, or compliance ... would undermine important int.erests of the
state where the information is located.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (REvtSED) § 437(l)(c)
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) (approved May 14, 1986) (current version at RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(1)(c) (1986)). However, in adopting the test suggested by the American Law Institute, the Court omitted
any mention of the prerequisite for reaching the test at all; specifically it failed to mention that requests for discovery from abroad should come through court order, not private parties as permitted in usual domestic litigation. Courts should only issue such
orders after careful scrutiny of the party's request to ensure that the information sought
is "directly relevant and material." It is at this stage that the comity analysis is triggered.
!d. comment a and reporter's note 2. Moreover, the fourth element of the test, regard·
ing alternative means, contemplates that a court will consider resorting to the Evidence
Convention procedures before issuing an order under the Federal Rules. See RESTATEMENT OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (REvtSED) § 473 (Tent. Draft
No.6, 1985) (approved Apr. 12, 1985), reporter's note 6 (current version at RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 473, reporter's note 6
(1986)).
95. 107 S. Ct. at 2556, n.29.
96. /d. Indeed, the Court bristled at the "extraordinary exercise of legislative jurisdiction" by France over U.S. judges which the broad language of the French statute
implies. /d. It is true that the French blocking statute appears to reach activity which will
take place both within and outside France by prohibiting requests for evidence as well as
the gathering of such evidence. See supra note 87. However, that blocking statute also
reinforces France's commitment to the Convention; "[t]he French statute's prohibitions
are expressly 'subject to' international agreements and applicable laws and it does not
affect the taking of evidence under the Convention." 107 S. Ct. at 2566 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting in part).

1988]

Taking Evidence and BreaAing Treaties

463

dissent, identified some of the practical weaknesses of the majority opinion. However, while the dissent accurately predicted the
quagmire of inconsistent discovery rulings into which the majority's opinion would plunge U.S. district courts, it does not adequately address the opinion's analytical shortcomings.
The bulk of the majority opinion is directed toward refuting
the contention that the Convention is the "exclusive" means for
obtaining evidence abroad in cases where the party obligated to
produce evidence confronts a foreign blocking law. Both the
majority opinion and the argument it purports to refute interpret
''exclusivity'' to mean the displacement of procedures available
under the Federal Rules for obtaining evidence located abroad.97
However, this interpretation is illogical. The Evidence Convention contains the only procedures available for extracting evidence from a foreign signatory state which prohibits the
requested party from removing the evidence itself; there are no
other procedures for it to pre-empt.98 The only proper question,
then, is whether the Convention procedures are mandatory.
Must signatories to the Convention use the Convention procedures to assist parties before their courts who are faced with such
a conflict, or may they instead leave litigants to their own devices
and simply punish them for the inadequacy of their efforts?
In considering whether the Convention procedures are
mandatory, the Court first observed that the Preamble to the
Convention states as its purposes facilitating the transmission
and execution of letters of request and improving mutual judicial
cooperation,99 but concluded from the absence of any mandatory
terms that adherence to the Convention is qot required. 100 However, the absence of an explicit statement that the contracting
97. See id. at 2550 ("The Hague Convention might be read as requiring its use to
the exclusion of any other discovery procedures whenever evidence located abroad is
sought for use in an American coun. ").
98. Absent the Convention, requested parties in that situation could retrieve evidence from abroad only pursuant to letters rogatory. See supra notes 3-27, 61-62 and
accompanying text. The Convention incorporates this procedure and adds to it the
option of taking evidence through diplomatic or consular officers, or commissioners. See
supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. See also supra note 53 ~nd accompanying text
(noting that the Evidence Convention does not pre-empt the Federal Rules).
99. Evidence Convention, supra note I, Preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, T.I.A.S. No.
744.
I 00. 107 S. Ct. at 2550 n.l5. The Court compared the Evidence Convention to the
Multilateral Convention on the Service Abroad ofjudicial and Extrajudicial Documents,
entered into force, February 10, 1969,20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [hereinafter Service
Convention]. The former provides that "a Contracting State may . __ request the competent authority of another Contracting State ... to obtain evidence, or to perform
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states must inst~ct their courts to honor all proper 101 requests
by litigants that Convention procedures be used certainly does
not preclude the possibility that the signatories agreed to do just
that. 102
The majority also concluded from the absence of any explicit
language to the contrary, that "the Evidence Convention itself
does not modify the law of any contracting State . . . or compel
any contracting State to change its own evidence-gathering procedures." 105 This conclusion is unwarranted. The Convention is
necessarily silent regarding the effect it will have on the laws of
each nation. Treaty implementation is a matter of domestic law
for each signatory, 104 and the laws. of each signatory will mesh
uniquely with an international agreement. For civil law states,
the Convention clearly does modify law and procedures, insofar
as these states are now required to comply with letters of request
and to use the -procedures that the sending state directs. 105 This
raises the question, left unanswered by the majority, as to what
consideration the United States gave to the civil law countries in
return for their agreement to modify their law and practices.
Justice Stevens drew similarly unsupportable conclusions from
the permissive language that precedes the enumeration of each
of the Convention procedures. 106 The Court failed to consider
that if more than one set of discovery procedures is available
under the Convention, it would be illogical to use mandatory language for any one of them. The fact that a requesting state may
use letters rogatory or may use a consul or commissioner for taking evidence in a signatory state under the Convention does not
some other judicial act." Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. I. In contrast, the
Service Convention mandates that "the present Convention slw.ll apply in all cases, in civil
or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial
document for service abroad." Service Convention, supra, art. I, 20 U.S.T. at ~62,
T.I.A.S. No. 66~8. at 2 (emphasis added).
101. See supra note 80 (noting that parties should demonstrate that the evidence is in
another state and that the state has an effective blocking statute before Conventionbased requests should issue).
102. "Intention or meaning in a contract may be manifested or conveyed either
expressly or impliedly, and it is fundamental that that which is plainly or necessarily
implied in the language of a contract is as much a pan of it as that which is expressed."
17 AM.juR. 2n Contracts§ 255 (1964) (citations omitted).
10~. 107 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
104. See generally UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF THE MuLTILATERAL TREATI-MAxlNG
PRocEss 36, 148-49 (1985) (noting that, following agreement on the text of a treaty,
each state must take domestic action to bind itselO; A. McNAIR, LAw OF TREATIES 58-77
(1961) (discussing the authority that various states grant to their treaty negotiators).
105. See supra notes S 1-~9. 69 and accompanying text.
106. See 107 S. Ct. at 2551.
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preclude the inference that a forum state must select one of these
options. 107 Once again, a common sense contractual interpretation of the treaty reveals the degree to which Convention procedures are "mandatory." By identifying the consideration each
signatory gave and by understanding how the document affects
their behavior, one can determine the effect that the treaty has on
U.S. law. The majority neglected to undertake such an analysis.
In a footnote, Justice Stevens asserted that the current position
of the executive branch on this issue supported the Court's interpretation of the Convention procedures as nonmandatory . 108
However, the government's view suffered from the same erroneous assumption as that of the majority - that there are procedures other than those contained in the Convention "by which
American plaintiffs might obtain foreign evidence" when, as in
the Aerospatiale case, the law of a foreign state prevents the
requested party from complying with a discovery order. 1o9 Even
if the administration's views were well-founded, the interpretations that the executive branch accords to a treaty from year to
year 110 are irrelevant to a court's determination of treaty obligations. General principles of contract law dictate that where an
obligation arises by necessary implication from the stated terms
of the contract, it is binding on the parties in the same way that
explicit promises are binding, and must be interpreted in light of
the overall structure and purpose of the contract and the understanding of the parties at the time of its execution. 111 A party
cannot unilaterally amend its obligations by announcing a new
· and different interpretation of the contract terms.
107. Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "may" as "[d]iscretionary in its grammatical
sense but subject to construction as mandatory where the sense of the entire context
impels such construction." BALLENTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 785 (3d ed. 1969). State
courts have construed the word "may" as mandatory where a permissive construction
would render a contract without consideration on the part of one party, and therefore
nugatory. See, e.g., Girard Trust Bank v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 364 A.2d 495,
498-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
108. See 107 S. Ct. at 2551 n.l9.
109. /d. (quoting Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 9).
110. In 1983, the Justice Department submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme
Court in which it took an opposite position - that the Convention "must be interpreted
to preclude an evidence taking proceeding in the territory of a foreign state party if the
Convention does not authorize it and the host country does not otherwise permit it."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Falzon. 464 U.S. 811 (1983) (No. 82-1888) , repnnted in 23 I.L.M. 412. 415 (1983) , appeal
dismisud. 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
Ill. 17 AM. juR. 2o Contracts § 255 ( 1964).
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Justice Stevens found further support for his conclusions in
Article 23 of the Convention, 112 which allows a contracting state
to declare that it will not execute any letter of request for the
purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery. He believed it inconceivable that the common law signatories would agree to cede
their courts' broad powers of discovery when other signatories
would be entitled to prohibit the taking of pre-trial evidence. 113
However, by committing its courts to use Convention procedures
to assist litigants in complying with discovery requests, a nation
does not waive its authority to control litigation. Its courts retain
their power to order further production and to impose costs and
other sanctions for non-compliance. 114 Correspondingly, the
commitment ofall signatory states to use Convention procedures
does not bestow added power upon receiving states to control
the course of evidence gathering or production for foreign litigation} 15 Were there no Convention at all, foreign states would
have absolute control over evidence-gathering activities within
their borders, and the production aspect of discovery would.
remain entirely within the control of the forum court. 116
The only sovereignty which the Convention compromises is
that of the civil law signatories as states receiving letters of
request, who agreed to modify their law and practices. 117 Article
23 simply permits these countries to limit the extent to which
they will compromise their sovereignty in this fashion. 118 Even
after the making of an Article 23 reservation, civil law states have
made a substantial sacrifice in agreeing to comply with discovery
requests from U.S. courts. This concession is certainly adequate
consideration for the United States' reciprocal promise simply to
make such discovery requests on behalf of parties to litigation.
Moreover, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, the meaning of the
term "pre-trial discovery'' in Article 23 differs from the meaning
in American courts. 119 The civil law countries did not hope to
112. Evidence Convention, supra note I, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, T.I.A.S. No. 744.
113. I 07 S. Ct . .at 2551-52.
114. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
115. See 107 S. Ct. at 2553 ("An interpretation of the Hague Convention as the
exclusive means for obtaining evidence located abroad would effectively subject every
American court hearing a case involving a national of a contracting State to the internal
laws of that State.").
116. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
117. See .rupra note 69 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 39.
119. 107 S. Ct. at 2565-66 n.21 (Blackmun, j.. dissenting in part); see supra note 39.
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prevent discovery after the filing of a complaint and before commencement of the trial; they merely sought to prohibit "fishing
expeditions" prior to the initiation ofjudicial proceedings. 12o As
noted above, many of the countries that registered Article 23
declarations have since qualified them by stating that they will
comply with discovery requests that are specific and that seek relevant evidence.I2I
The majority also invoked the language of Article 27 as evidence that the Convention is not mandatory. 122 Article 27 states
that the Convention shall not prevent a contracting state from
"permitting, by internal law or practice," the performance of any
act provided for in the Convention on "less restrictive conditions," or from permitting "methods of taking evidence other
than those provided for" in the Convention. 12S However, this
option clearly applies only to receiving states and not to sending
states. A provision permitting a signatory to define any procedure it wished for extracting evidence from another state would
render the rest of the Convention meaningless and constitute an
unprecedented relinquishment of sovereign authority. 12 4
The majority's final argument against "exclusivity" was that
"exclusivity" would put certain U.S. litigants in a disadvantageous position. First, the Court argued, because foreign parties
would be able to obtain discovery from U.S. parties under the
Federal Rules, while U.S. parties would have to use the Convention procedures, the former would have access to more information than would the latter. 125 Second, a foreign corporation
would have an advantage in the United States over a U.S. competitor, because a third party suing both would be able to extract
120. Set REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 1421-23.
121. Supra note 39. See In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, 1 All E.R. 716,
720-22 ( 1985) (explaining the United Kingdom's standard of specificity as requiring that
requested documents must be "actual" - defined as documents that definitely exist or
did exist, and are likely to be in the respondent's possession); In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 784, 788 (1977) (holding
that a document request directed to the United Kingdom should be as specific as would
be required for a subpoena duces tecum).
122. 107 S. Ct. at 2552-53 n.24.
123. Evidence Convention, supra note I. art. 27, 23 U .S.T. at 2569, T.I.A.S. No. 744.
124. See 107 S. Ct. at 2559 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). See also Amram,
United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J.
hrr'L L. 104, I 07 (1973) ("If the domestic law of the requested state is more beneficial and
more flexible in favor of the foreign litigant than the Convention techniques, those more
liberal rules of the domestic law will remain available to the foreign litigant and the
requesting authority.") (emphasis added).
125. 107 S. Ct. at 2553 n.25.
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more information from the U.S. corporation than from the foreign corporation.l 26 Third, one U.S. litigant suing a citizen of a
non-signatory state would have an advantage oyer another U.S.
litigant suing a citizen of a signatory state, because the former
would be permitted to use the Federal Rules. 12'
While some inequity might arise from a rule specifying that use
of Convention procedures precludes subsequent invocation of
the Federal Rules, no such inequity arises from simply making
use of Convention procedures mandatory when properly
requested. The majority failed to recognize that a rule requiring
adherence to the Convention in the first instance would not
diminish the authority of federal courts to correct for any unfairness by limiting the discovery of either party, drawing adverse
inferences, or allocating costs. Thus, the proper result in Aerospatiale would have been to require the district court to honor the
French defendant's petition for use of Convention procedures, to
impose on the defendant the costs of using those procedures, 128
to subsequently issue a Rule 3 7 order for production if Conven-·
tion methods elicited incomplete evidence, and to sanction Aerospatiale for any non-compliance with that order. 129
The "inequity" argument suffers from additional infirmities.
The majority assumed incorrectly that the nationality of the litigants triggers the Convention when, in fact, it is the situs of the
evidence that controls. 1so While it may be likely that more of the
evidence in the control of a foreign party is in a foreign state than
is the evidence in the control of a party who is a U.S. citizen, this
126. Jd;
127. /d.
128. These costs might include fees paid to translators, experts, interpreters, and
other costs paid in connection with the procurement of evidence under the Convention.
See Evidence Convention, supra note I, arts. 4, 14, 26, 23 U.S.T. at 2559-60, 2563-64,
2569, T.I.A.S. No. 744. Costs may also include the loss experienced by a requested
party because of any incremental delay created by the use of Convention procedures.
See FEn. R. C1v. P. 37(a)(4).
129. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2). The court should limit these sanctions to redressing
the actual harm caused by non-compliance. For example, the district court should draw
adverse inferences only as to the specific issues left unresolved, and impose only actual
costs incurred by the requesting party in securing the evidence by other means. Su
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commercialles, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 213 (1958). After it has been established that failure to comply has
been due to legal inability, the good or bad faith ofthe party should be irrelevant. Punitive sanctions are unnecessary to encourage compliance, and would further no due process objective. At the same time, good faith efforts do not diminish the strength of the
argument that any party acting in the United States assumes the risks attendant upon
such conduct, including the possibility of U.S.-style litigation. See supra note 81.
130. 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part).
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is not necessarily so. 131 Perhaps the most important defect in the
majority opinion, as Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, is that
it "completely ignores the very purpose of the Convention ... to
facilitate discovery, not to hamper litigants." 132 Having advance
knowledge that foreign states would accommodate their discovery requests under the Convention, litigants in the United States
would be in a much better position than they were prior to the
Convention when they could not be certain that even a letter
from the court would yield the desired evidence.
After dismissing the notion of exclusivity, the majority directly
addressed the possibility that the Convention requires requesting
parties to resort to its procedures before "initiating any discovery
pursuant to the normal methods of the Federal Rules."Iss The
way the Court posed the question is another indication of its misunderstanding of what the Convention adds to a no-Convention
world. As noted above, 134 the Convention procedures would
exhaust the "normal methods" available under the Federal Rules
for obtaining evidence in such a case. The majority's answer to
the question is germane nonetheless. It consists of an objection
to the supposed additional expense which Convention procedures entail, 135 coupled with the contention that international
comity precludes the establishment of such a uniform rule of
"first use". u 6
Justice Stevens alleged that letters of request are time-consuming and expensive, and claimed that direct use of the Federal
Rules is more certain to produce needed evidenceYH Once
again, the opinion betrays a failure to comprehend that the only
means available under the Federal Rules for extracting evidence
from a country which prohibits parties to U.S. litigation from
gathering evidence within its borders is a letter of request. 138
131. See supra note 9 (noting that the Convention would apply to the taking of evidence from the foreign branch or subsidiary of a U.S. corporation as well as from U.S.
citizens abroad).
132. 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (emphasis in the original).
133. /d. at 2554.
134. Set supra note 98 and accompanying text.
135. 107 S. Ct. at 2555.
136. Id.
137. /d.
138. FED. R. C1v. P. 28(b). While this same rule authorizes the taking of depositions
abroad by a person commissioned by a court, a U.S. court has no power to order this
method where the foreign state objects to it as an intrusion on its judicial sovereignty.
See id. advisory committee's note. Cf United States v. Paraffin Wax, 2255 Bags. 23
F.R.D. 289, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (noting that a commission was inappropriate because
the requested state would only permit letters rogatory).
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The Convention incorporates this method and adds less formal
procedures, 139 thereby facilitating discovery which is less expensive and more useful than discovery under the Federal Rules, and
making it easier for the United States to live up to its treaty obligations.140 Regular employment of Convention procedures
would make their use increasingly more efficient, and obviate the
majority's concerns as to cost.
Finally, the majority held that "the concept of international
comity requires in this context a more particularized analysis of
the respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting
nation than petitioners' proposed general rule would generate."141 This conclusion must derive from the Court's earlier
arguments relating to potential inequities - its belief that
mandatory use of the Convention procedures would prejudice
U.S. citizens.l 42 Under the Court's theory, a general rule requiring use of the Convention would always be more satisfactory to
foreign states than it would to U.S. litigants. Therefore, although
courts typically engage in a comity analysis to ensure proper consideration of foreign state interests and those of the international
legal community,t 4s the only conceivable goal of requiring a
time-consuming and potentially expensive comity analysis at this
juncture would be to enable district courts to correct any seeming unfairness to U.S. citizens. This article has already addressed
the weaknesses in the inequity argument. 144 A comity analysis is
inappropriate in Convention cases for additional reasons as well.
A comity analysis in individual cases may be appropriate when
there is no general rule and when a true conflict of laws exists. 14s
However, as explained above, 146 there is no legal conflict
between the Federal Rules and foreign blocking laws as each is
139. See Evidence Convention, supra note I, ch. II, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-68, T.l.A.S. No.
744 (providing for the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents and
commissioners).
140. The Court acknowledged that in some instances, use of the Convention would
be the more fruitful avenue of discovery, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.26, but it did not offer
examples of appropriate circumstances.
141. /d. at 2555 (footnotes omitted).
142. Set supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
143. See Pierburg GmbH v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 243-44, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 876, 880 (1982) (citations omitted).
144. Set supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
145. Set 107 S. Ct. at 2561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); RESTATEMENT Of
FoREIGN RELATIONS LAw Of THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437(l)(c) (Tent. Draft No.
7), supra note 94, comment a and reporter's note 2, § 473 (Tent. Draft No.6), supra note
94. reporter's note 6.
I 46. Set supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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properly understood and applied. Each pertains only to activity
within the respective state's territory. The only conflict is the
practical one experienced by the producing party who is unable
to satisfy the law of both countries. The Evidence Convention
supplies a general rule to resolve this situation. In negotiating
and drafting the treaty, officials and experts from various sovereign states considered the factors that are relevant to a comity
analysis, and represented the sovereign interests of the signatory
states better than individual litigants possibly could in the hundreds of cases to be brought in U.S. district courts. 147 The Convention represents a compromise of those sovereign interests
and the interests of each state's citizens.
The majority imputes to district court judges a knowledge of
the laws, policies, and interests of foreign governments. Justice
Blackmun recognized that this confidence is unfounded, and concluded that courts are ill-equipped to balance the interests of foreign nations with those of their own. 148 Justice Blackmun further
suggested that district court judges are inexperienced in the area
of transnational litigation and unfamiliar with the procedures of
foreign legal systems. Consequently, they are likely to be biased
in favor of U.S. procedures and against foreign litigants.l 49
Thus, the inevitable result of the individualized comity analysis
which the Aerospatiale decision requires will be inconsistent, inaccurate, and inequitable decisions at the trial court level 15° - an
outcome inimical to the interests of all nations and all private
actors in international markets.
Justice Blackmun's principal criticism of the majority opinion
was that it provides insufficient guidance to district courts faced
with international discovery disputes.l 51 However, the dissent
stopped short of finding a " first use" requirement in U.S. law
147. See 107 S. Ct. at 2561-62 (Blackmun,J., dissenting in part); Maier, Extraterritorial
Discovery: Cooperation. Coercion and the Hagru Evidence Convention , 19 VAND. j. TRANSNAT'L L.
239, 255 (1986) ("[T]he best evidence of an effective balancing of competing national
interests is the content of an international agreement .. . not ajudicial opinion reflecting
the unilateral speculation of a court.").
148. 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Biackmun,J., dissenting in part) (quoting Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983), in which the Supreme Court itself stated
that it has "little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be
offended by particular acts") (other citations omitted) .
149. /d.
150. See A. NEALE & M. STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 94-98; infra notes 155-87 and
accompanying text.
151. "The majority fails to offer guidance in this endeavor, and thus it has missed its
opportunity to provide predictable and effective procedures for international litigation
in United States courts." 107 S. Ct. at 2568 (Biackmun, J.. dissenting in part).
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because it believed that a comity analysis might be required when
the foreign state has made an Article 23 reservation, or when
resort to the Convention would be futile. 152 At the same time,
Justice Blackmun admitted that concerns about Article 23 may be
unjustified and that it may be impossible to tell if resort to the
Convention procedures would be futile until a court actually
tried them. 155 It should take little time to learn whether a foreign
state will reject outright a request pursuant to the Convention,
and courts can thereafter tailor their letters of request to satisfy
the foreign state or, if the foreign state indicated that no request
would satisfy it, immediately issue a Rule 3 7 order for production. Thus, although Justice Blackmun advocated only "a general presumption favoring use of the Convention," 154 his
reasoning should lead to the conclusion that U.S. law requires
courts to use the Convention whenever requested.

VII.

PosT-AEROSPATIALE CAsEs

Justice Blackmun's predictions of future unsatisfactory district
court decisions 155 have quickly become reality. Lower court
opinions following Aerospatiale have been parochial in their analysis, inconsistent in their conclusions, and given to unsubstantiated generalizations.l 56 The opinions demonstrate the defects of
the case-by-case comity analysis which the Aerospatiale majority
mandated.
A.

Applying the Blackmun Analysis

Only one post-Aerospatiale court to date has required use of
Convention procedures. In Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter, 151 a case
involving discovery of evidence located in West Germany, the
district court noted Justice Stevens' explicit failure to offer guidance158 and so applied the three-part analysis which Justice
Blackmun offered. Justice Blackmun proposed that courts balance "the foreign interests, the interests of the United States, and
the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning
international legal regime," but recognize that, in most cases, the
152.
15:i.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

!d. at 2567 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part).
!d.
/d. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
Su id. at 2558, 2559 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part).
Su infra notes 171, 172, 175, 178-18:i and accompanying text.
117 F.R.D. 22 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
/d. at 36.
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Convention has already "accommodated all three categories of
interests." 159 The Hudson court concluded under this framework
that it was appropriate to grant the request of a foreign party that
it use the Convention procedures. 160
The Hudson court's assessment of the foreign sovereign's interests was consistent with our common sense interpretation of the
Evidence Convention. West Germany's constitution contains a
"principle of proportionality" that necessarily subjects the scope
of discovery to judicial control. Therefore, the gathering of evidence by private parties on West German soil would constitute
"nothing less than a violation of West Germany's internal laws by
outsiders with the approval and support of American courts." 161
The court concluded that the requesting party and the American
courts could avoid this affront by acting in accordance with the
Convention. Because West Germany is a signatory to the Evidence Convention, 162 the terms of the treaty are essentially a
manifestation of the extent to which West Germany is willing to
compromise its sovereign interests. 16S
After determining that the interests of the foreign sovereign
dictated use o(the Convention, the court found that such compliance would not jeopardize the interests of the United States in
achieving effective discovery procedures, just resolution of disputes, and accountability of foreign entities conducting business
in the States.l 64 There was no certainty that West Germany
would deny any requests, 165 and the court had the power under
the Federal Rules to compel discovery from, and limit discovery
for, the foreign party should the Convention procedures prove
inadequate. 166
Finally, the court noted the interests of the international legal
community in the use of procedures that are both effective and
non-violative of another sovereign's laws. The court stated that
such accommodation would have a positive effect on international cooperation, promote " 'predictability and stability
159. Aerospatiak, 107 S. Ct. at 2562 (Biackmun, J., dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
160. 117 F.R.D. at 40.
161. /d. at 38.
162. 8 MARTINDALE-HuBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15, 17-18 (1988).
163. 117 F.R.D. at 38.
164. Jd. at 38-39.
165. See id. at 39 (citation omitted) (noting that West Germany was considering new
regulations to permit pre-trial production of" 'specified and relevant documents' ").
166. /d.
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through satisfaction of mutual expectation,' " and encourage
international commercial activity. 167
Among post-Aerospatiale cases, the Hudson court stands alone in
concluding from an independent comity analysis that it must
employ the Evidence Convention in the first instance to obtain
evidence located abroad. 168 A review of cases in which courts
have concluded that they should not use Convention procedures
demonstrates the inadequacy of the Aerospatiale approach.

B. Applying The Analysis of the Aerospatiale Majority

The courts following Aerospatiale that have ruled that Convention procedures were inapplicable have expressed due concern
for the interests of foreign states and the purposes of the Convention.169 However, the rulings and rationale of their decisions
reveal that this professed deference is mere lip service.
In applying the Aerospatiale rule, the lower courts have gone
even further than the Supreme Court in narrowing the range of
situations in which they will employ Evidence Convention procedures. This has been accomplished by imposing on the party
invoking the Convention the burden of proving that use of Convention procedures is appropriate. 170 This rule creates a presumption against compliance with the Convention, and amounts
to an abdication of the courts' own authority to require adherence to its procedures.
In considering whether parties have met their burden of proof,
167. /d. at 39-40 (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
168. Some ofthe later district court opinions criticize Hudson for being too reliant on
Justice Blackmun's analysis and not attentive enough to the narrower considerations put
forth by the majority- namely, the need to decide cases on an individual basis by focusing on the particular facts and the likely effectiveness of Convention procedures. See
Haynes v. Kleinwefers and Lembo Corp., 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeho1m Corp. , 118 F.R.D. 386, 389 n.2 (D.N.J. 1987).
169. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 838 F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[I)t would
be a serious mistake for the district court not to respect properly [sensitive interests of a
sovereign power]."); Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 388 ("Due respect must be accorded
special problems encountered by a foreign litigant because of its nationality, location or
any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.") .
170. Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257-58 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (the proponent of using the Evidence Convention must prove that the discovery requests are
intrusive, that the requests implicate important interests of a foreign sovereign, and that
use of the Convention would be effective); Haynes , 119 F.R.D. at 341; Benton Graphics,
118 F.R.D. at 388-89. Contra, Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter, 117 F.R.D. at 38 ("[T)he
burden should be placed on the party opposing the use of Convention procedures to
demonstrate that those procedures would frustrate [the United State's) interests.").
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these courts have summarily rejected evidence of foreign state
interests that would support the use of Convention procedures.
For example, one court confronted with the French blocking statute concluded that it did not "warrant much deference" because
it was "overly broad and vague." 171 Similarly, another court dismissed as "too general" a letter from the Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs reciting that country's interests in use of the Convention.172 This latter court's complaint illustrates a critical flaw
in the Aerospatiale case-by-case analysis. The court found the
asserted interests of Sweden to be uncompelling because the
government's letter failed to relate "specific sovereign interests"
to the "specific discovery sought." 173 The authors submit that the
interests of any one nation will rarely vary with the particular discovery demands in individual cases. To require district courts to
analyze- and foreign parties and their governments to defend-·
sovereign interests in every case is truly "duplicative analysis for
which courts are not well designed." 174
Finally, the various lower court opinions rejecting use of Convention procedures are circular and nonsensical. First, in an
echo of the pre-Aerospatiale cases that refused to order compliance with the treaty, the courts continue to speculate about the
time, expense, and difficulty involved in Convention procedures
without having actually tried to use them to see if they are indeed
more unwieldy. 175 Moreover, they offer conflicting and condusory statements that fail to accord any continued vitality to the
Convention. 176
One source of confusion appears to be justice Stevens' suggestion that only the more burdensome discovery requests need
conform to the Convention.l 77 For example, the court in Haynes
v. Kleinwefers and Lembo Corp. concluded that since the discovery
requests at issue were relatively narrow, there was no need to risk
using Convention procedures to obtain evidence from a state
that has made an Article 23 reservation. 178 However, the court
171. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258.
172. Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 391.
173. /d. (emphasis in original).
174. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559 (Biackmun,J., dissenting in part).
175. See Haynes v. Kleinwefers and Lembo Corp., 119 F.R.D. 335, 339 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (concluding that discovery pursuant to the Convention from the Federal Republic
of Germany would be "of necessity more costly and time consuming" and possibly
incomplete).
176. See infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.
177. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
178. 119 F.R.D. at 339. See also Rich v. KIS California, Inc. 121 F.R.D. 254, 258
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failed to acknowledge West Germany's record of accommodating
specific discovery requests notwithstanding its reservation. 179
There was simply no reason to believe that Germany would fail
to execute the "circumscribed" requests at issue. Conversely,
the court in Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp. acknowledged that
discovery would be extensive, but still held the Convention inapplicable because the discovery was vital to the plaintiff's case.l 80
The courts have also manifested confusion about how to weigh
fo~eign int~rests and incompatible sovereign demands in deciding whether to use the treaty procedures. For example, after noting that Sweden had expressed a direct interest in the
forthcoming discovery, the Benton Graphics court still held that the
Convention was unnecessary because the defendants failed to
identify any "special problem" which responding to the plaintiff's discovery requests would entail. 181 One would think that a
blocking statute presents such a "special problem." Yet, the Rich
v. KIS California, Inc. court held that employment of Convention
procedures was unnecessary for discovery to occur in France·
because the requests at issue did not impinge on any "important" sovereign interests. 182 The court ignored France's explicit
statutory prohibition against the production of evidence for litigation abroad when not requested in accordance with the Evidence Convention. ass
These cases suggest that courts will invoke the Convention
only when discovery is abusive, 184 the evidence will not be dispositive of the major issues, 185 the foreign sovereign has a particularized complaint about the requests and expresses an interest
that the district court is willing to respect, 186 and there is no risk
that the foreign government will refuse to comply in fun.as7
Neither the language of the treaty nor the expressed intentions
(M.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that use of the Convention procedures was unnecessary
because the discovery was not abusive).
179. See Brief for the Federal Republic of Gennany as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695).
180. 118 F.R.D. at 391. The court declined to use the Convention even after
aclrnowledging that virtually all the requested evidence and witnesses were located in
Sweden. /d.
181. /d.
182. 121 F.R.D. at 258.
183. /d. See supra note 87 (providing text of French blocking statute).
184. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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of the signatory nations support this interpretation. Yet, the
Supreme Court in Aerospatiale failed to set forth principles that
would temper this unprincipled exercise of district court discretion. Consequently, the progeny of Aerospatiale threaten to
render the Evidence Convention an ineffectual relic.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's explicit rejection of both the "exclusivity" and "mandatory" positions which some lower courts had
adopted prior to Aerospatiale operates as a significant constraint
on future decisions. The Aerospatiale decision will preclude trial
courts from honoring proper requests for the use of Convention
procedures unless the courts are able to discern that the
Supreme Court's premises were erroneous - i.e. unless they
realize, after arriving at a common sense understanding of the
Convention, that the interests of the parties and sovereign states
concerned always counsel in favor of its use. To date, such an
understanding has eluded the courts. Consequently, parties to
transnational litigation continue to suffer the burdens and frustrations of thwarted foreign discovery. Thus, the great promise
of the Evidence Convention remains unfulfilled.
The Supreme Court has squandered an opportunity to infuse
much needed efficiency into the process of international discovery by its failure to appreciate the bounds which international law
places on the powers of United States courts and foreign sover.eigns, and to interpret the Convention in clear contractual terms.
The parochial and arbitrary decisions that follow Aerospatiale are
likely to heighten objections from foreign states regarding U.S.
treatment of foreign nationals. These states may, as a consequence, become unwilling to continue to honor their own obligation under the Convention to execute discovery requests from
U.S. courts. 188
In the wake of Aerospatiale, hope for a regime of fair and efficient discovery rules appears to reside in the possibility that signatory nations will renegotiate the Convention to make its
mandatory nature more explicit, or that Congress will enact a
federal statute directing U.S. courts to use Convention procedures whenever requested. Such a statute would foster stability
and predictability in transnational litigation and would enable
actors involved in international commerce to order their affairs
188. See Oxman, supra note 80, at 769.
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more rationally. Foreign companies would be better able to measure accurately the costs of doing business in the United States,
and to allocate those costs in a more efficient manner by private
contract. 189 Greater certainty concerning discovery procedures
would likely reduce the number ·of pre-trial evidentiary disputes.
When litigation arises, a statute mandating use of the Convention
would induce parties to make the most effective use of the
treaty's procedures: The powers U.S. courts retain under the
Federal Rules to sanction non-production would encourage producing parties to cooperate with discovery requests, and the
knowledge that the Convention procedures are likely to yield
more ·complete discovery, and therefore, a more accurate and
just result, would prompt requesting parties to _conform their discovery to its terms. Finally, requiring courts to use Convention
procedures would foster more reasonable treatment of foreign
litigants and greater cooperation with foreign states. The resulting improvement in international relations would engender a
more hospitable climate for persons living, travelling, and trans-·
acting business outside their home state - the as yet unrealized
hope of the Hague Evidence Convention.

189. Su Scherk. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-18 (1974) (noting the practical need in international business contracts to resolve imminent uncertainties in
advance).

